CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

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There are seven billion people. Nearly one billion are estimated to be malnourished. Several million die each year of easily preventable hunger-related conditions. Yet others are living through a culinary golden age: new cuisines, old cuisines brought to new places, cookbook upon cookbook, and TV food shows. Food for a huge price. Food for cheap. But plenty of food for those who can afford it.

Some of the food is produced by raising and killing animals. Worldwide, tens of millions of buffalo are killed for us to eat, hundreds of millions of cattle and sheep, billions of pigs, and tens of billions of chickens.\(^1\)

Some of the food is produced by raising and killing plants. Worldwide, over 5 billion tons of crops are produced annually. This includes several billion tons of cereals, over a billion tons of vegetables and melons, and about half a billion tons of other fruit.\(^2\) Such a large quantity of crop production has negative impacts on biodiversity, on soil and water quality, and on other aspects of the environment.\(^3\)

Some of the food is produced by the people who eat it. Much of it is produced by others, others who labor in a range of circumstances. In 2007, Barbara Kingsolver published a book about her family’s exhausting but idyllic life farming for themselves in Virginia, while John Bowe published one about agricultural slave labor in Florida.

Some of the food is marketed: piled in boxes with handwritten signs at a farmers’ market or wrapped in plastic and put in a box with Count Chocula on the cover.

Some of it gets eaten. A lot of it does not. As Erich and Jaclyn Hatala Matthes write in their contribution to this book, up to 30% of rice produced fails to reach consumers.

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Up to 50% of fresh produce fails to do so. Nearly 40% of food the United States produces is wasted. Still other food is not wasted, but is also never even intended for human consumption: it is instead turned into biofuels or used for other industrial purposes.

One might ask various ethical questions about the foregoing: Are the states of affairs good? Bad? Are individual people in them acting wrongly? Are things other than individual people—governments, corporations, collectives, economic orders—acting wrongly? If some of these actions are wrong, why are they wrong? Because they are unjust? Cruel? Oppressive? Or something else? Are agents who perform the wrongful actions blameworthy for doing so? If certain states of affairs (or policies or market structures) are not ethically good states of affairs, should they be replaced? With what?

Food ethics has developed various responses to these questions. It has made ever more careful, nuanced versions of arguments that date back to ancient philosophy. It has made new ones on new topics.

Food ethics, as an academic pursuit, is vast. It incorporates work from philosophy but also anthropology, economics, environmental sciences and other natural sciences, geography, and sociology. Scholars from these fields, including some philosophers, have been producing work for decades on the food system, and on ethical, social, and policy issues connected to the food system. Yet in the last several years, there has been a notable increase in philosophical work on these issues—work that draws on multiple literatures within practical ethics, normative ethics, and political philosophy. This Handbook introduces and adds to that philosophical work across multiple areas of food ethics.

**A SHORT HISTORY OF RECENT WORK IN FOOD ETHICS**

In a recent essay on the origins of food ethics, Paul Thompson distinguishes between what we here call food ethics—"a deliberative inquiry into the normative dimensions . . . of food"—and the social movement to promote ethical states of affairs in the food system, the constellation of food producers, processors, marketers, transporters, preparers, and eaters that gets food from ground to mouth. This distinction between food ethics as an academic pursuit and its related social movement is a useful one, notwithstanding that some individuals are engaged in both pursuits.

As Thompson discusses, recent popular work on food ethics, fueled by and fueling the social movement he mentions, has followed a somewhat unsteady trajectory. Some classic books (*Silent Spring*, *Animal Machines*) and a documentary (*Harvest of Shame*)

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5 Ibid.
appeared in the early 1960s. Two more classics (Diet for a Small Planet and Animal Liberation) appeared in the early and mid-1970s. Then there was a lull before Fast Food Nation and Omnivore’s Dilemma appeared in the early and mid-2000s along with books and journals (Food Politics, Gastronomica, pieces in the Utne Reader) that were both scholarly and accessible.

And then came not just books and magazine articles but special issues of magazines, popular documentaries, TED talks, regular columns in national newspapers. Chefs now publish ethical arguments in addition to cookbooks. Food columnists now argue the ethics of veganism as well as sharing recipes.

Food ethics as a deliberative, academic inquiry could be traced back hundreds or even thousands of years. As Katja Vogt’s, Henrik Lagerlund’s, and John Grey and Aaron Garrett’s contributions to this book show, ancient, medieval, and modern philosophers concerned themselves with questions of what one may and may not eat, of what consumption said about eaters, and of the ethics of production.

New technologies have always provided good, new subjects for popular food ethics: these technologies enabled the industrial farms that were the subjects of Animal Machines and Harvest of Shame and that were the background for Silent Spring and Diet for a Small Planet, as they were the background for The Jungle in an earlier era. These technologies are important to deliberative, academic food ethics too. The recent history of deliberative, academic food ethics might be traced to Peter Singer’s work on animals and hunger in the early and mid-1970s, notably Animal Liberation and “Famine, Affluence and Morality.” The journals Environmental Ethics, Agriculture and Human Values, and The Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics were founded in 1979, 1984, and 1988, respectively, as the pace of papers on food ethics picked up. The 1990s saw the publication of books on philosophy and food, including books on food ethics by Deane Curtin and Lisa Heldke, Ben Mepham, Elizabeth Telfer, and Paul B. Thompson. By the new millennium, there was enough academic work to support three complementary histories of food ethics. More journals came: Gastronomica (2001), The Journal of Animal Ethics (2011), and Food Ethics (2016). Books came faster and faster. Food ethics, as a philosophical endeavor, now includes work on animals and hunger, but much more to boot: collective action, disgust, food justice, food labeling, genetic modification, locavorism, obesity, and the list goes on.

Overview

This book takes in some of that vastness but, as a matter of course, not all. It gives a sample of some philosophical work on food ethics. It is split into eight parts.

Part I: Conventional Agriculture and Alternatives

Part I, “Conventional Agriculture and Alternatives,” surveys the industrial model of farming that dominates in developed countries, looking most closely at industrial crop farming and its environmental effects. Industrial agriculture is typified by large-scale, highly mechanized farms that grow a single crop on large areas of land and use liberal amounts of synthetic fertilizers, synthetic pesticides, synthetic herbicides, and genetically modified seeds. Industrial farms have larger capital inputs of fertilizer, irrigated water, fossil fuels, and so on per unit of land area than alternative forms of agriculture, and are in this way much more intensive than alternatives. These large farms are clustered in areas of natural advantage: the Central Valley of California, the prairies of Saskatchewan, the cerrados of Brazil, and so on.

Industrial agriculture aims for the production of the greatest quantity of food in the smallest amount of space with the least labor, all for the ultimate goal of maximum profits. Of course, these goals were also more or less pursued by some preindustrial farmers. In order to achieve these goals now, however, farmers must invest large amounts of capital in recent technological advances, which have in turn made possible huge increases in crop yields both overall and per unit of land area, and reductions in the amount of land and labor necessary to achieve those yields. These technological changes and economic forces put the “industry” in “industrial” and explain the transformation in almost every developed nation from agriculturally focused societies to something else.

As a result of this transformation, there has been a large increase in the amount of food produced on agricultural land. This was made possible by nineteenth-century plant and soil science that suggested that what plants need from the soil is just a few nutrients—nutrients that could be given directly to plants in the form of fertilizer—and by selective breeding that produced higher yielding seeds. It was made possible, too, by important subsequent technological advances and investments in machinery, synthetic fertilizers, synthetic herbicides, synthetic fungicides, synthetic pesticides, irrigation (sometimes in the form of large public works projects paid for by taxpayers, such as large dam and water transportation infrastructure, but also including technology such as improved drilling, center pivot irrigation, etc.), and by GMOs that produced more food and promised a reduced need for herbicides and pesticides. Previously, farmers had, of course, worked to fertilize, kill weed, fungi, and pests, and plant high-yielding, hardy plants. But recent technological advances have massively improved that situation
and enabled farmers to work much larger farms without much more work. A US government official described this new form of agriculture as containing “the makings of a new revolution. It is not a violent red revolution like that of the Soviets, nor is it a White Revolution like that of the Shah of Iran. I call it the Green Revolution.” His term “Green Revolution” caught on and is now widely used to refer to the large increases in crop yields in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s that were associated with the development and deployment of important instances of the technologies we have described, especially as implemented in Asia and Latin America.

Larger farms located in the most advantageous places also enabled farmers to benefit from economies of scale: as farmers produced more, the costs they needed to pay for that production went down proportionately. This was aided by ever larger and more capable machinery. Larger farms reduced the number of farms, freeing up people to do other jobs. And the productivity of those large farms in certain especially agriculturally apt places enabled those farms to produce enough for places near and far. For example, whereas small states on the East Coast used to grow their own wheat, huge wheat producers in the Midwest and Great Plains—possessed of better natural resources than New England for growing wheat—eliminated that need. Whereas some places are unsuitable for growing much given their soil and climate, mega-farms in suitable spots made it possible to grow and then ship widely. But, at the same time, to make the most efficient use of many of these technologies and thus maximize the profitability of their farms, many farmers need to shift almost exclusively to monoculture—that is, planting all the same crop over a large area, and suppressing the growth of absolutely everything else. This is necessary because, for example, the combine harvester can very efficiently harvest many rows of corn, but, it cannot very well harvest a row of corn + strawberries + potatoes.

However, shifting to monocultures, like shifting to industrial agriculture generally, has environmental, social, and economic costs. Clark Wolf’s “Sustainable Agriculture” discusses the environmental costs. The essay considers various accounts of what sustainability is and then evaluates various practices according to whether they satisfy such accounts. Some of these are compatible with the industrial model. Others are alternatives to it.

Mark Budolfson’s “Food, the Environment, and Global Justice” also engages various conceptions of sustainability and argues that none should be the fundamentally important objective in connection with food systems or other societal issues. The bulk of his essay identifies and critically examines a standard form of argument for organic and vegan alternatives to contemporary industrial agriculture. This argument faces objections to its empirical premises, to its presumption that there is a single food system that minimizes harm along every dimension that matters and is best for the

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environment, and to the presumption that the ethically best food system for us to promote is the one that would be either best in ideal theory or best from the perspective of our domestic society. He argues that determining which food system we should actually promote requires a complex global, empirically and ethically integrated assessment that includes a proper accounting for values of global justice in nonideal theory, where that proper accounting arguably recommends a view that is called “sustainable intensification” in the food science literature, which involves more elements of contemporary industrial agriculture than are favored by proponents of organic or vegan alternatives.

One aspect of industrial farming in its current form is the use of genetically modified crops, crops modified to be drought-resistant, to be more nutritious, but also to withstand various synthetic chemicals that can be applied liberally to them. In “Genetically Modified Food,” Rachel A. Ankeny and Heather J. Bray survey ethical arguments for and against the production and consumption of genetically modified food. They argue that there should be more public discussion of these arguments and of genetic modification in general.

In “Local Food Movements: Differing Conceptions of Food, People, and Change,” Samantha E. Noll and Ian Werkheiser discuss the local food movement—a movement that aims to create alternative food systems focused on local production and distribution, a shorter supply chain, and, in some cases, more community control. Localized food systems are seen as “providing an alternative and challenge to the corporate-led, industrialized, global food system by reconnecting food with environmental health and sustainability, social justice concerns, and the importance of place.” Yet the local food movement has been criticized as not accomplishing these goals because it does not mount a significant challenge to the status quo or more fundamentally because localized food systems do not have the aimed-for benefits (e.g., a globalized system can actually be more ecologically sustainable than having localized food systems). Noll and Werkheiser get beneath the surface of these critiques, identifying three distinct sub-movements within the local food movement, which differ in their goals and their conceptions of food. They discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these three sub-movements and which critiques get traction with which sub-movements.

In “Farming, the Virtues, and Agrarian Philosophy,” Paul Thompson considers the philosophical approach to agriculture that is found in agrarianism, and contrasts agrarianism with mainstream consequentialist and deontological approaches in ethics. Agrarianism emphasizes the unique nature and significance of farming—from Aristotle, who saw the household farm as a model for the state, to Thomas Jefferson, who saw farmers as the best citizens, to the work of early modern thinkers, to contemporary agrarian thinkers who see farming as having special importance for environmental ethics and sustainability. Thompson contrasts agrarian approaches to farming and agriculture with the dominant approach in food ethics, which assumes that agriculture “can be analyzed and ethically evaluated using the same concepts and norms that would be used to critique any other sector of the economy”—concepts from consequentialist, deontological, and contractualist approaches.
Part II: Animals

The second part of the book, “Animals,” is partly about the industrial model of agriculture—large scale, highly mechanized, concentrated in few locations—applied to animal farming. Many billions of animals are raised for our consumption each year, the vast majority of them at high stocking density in conditions that discomfit them in various ways.

Animals on industrial farms cannot feed themselves. Since they need to be fed, farmers need to get food for them. And once they get fed, they make waste. These simple points about industrial animal agriculture underlie most of their environmental effects.

The food that is grown for these animals—often called feed when it is fed to them rather than to humans—is typically derived from industrial plant agriculture and often derived from corn or soy that is grown using the synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, and so on that are crucial to contemporary industrial plant agriculture. Their manufacture and distribution require fossil fuels. Feeding these crops to animals (which are then eaten by humans) uses many times as much food as would be required if humans ate these crops directly. As the number of animals on these farms rises, so too does the amount of food that needs growing. This leads to forest and other lands being turned into farmland, which leads to loss of habitat for wildlife and loss of biodiversity. When forests are clear-cut so the land can be used for agriculture, this is a loss of carbon sinks that remove greenhouse gases (GHGs) from the atmosphere, and the replacement of them with sources of GHGs, since agricultural fields are net emitters.

That is what goes into animals on industrial farms. Another environmental problem is what comes out. Animal feces are a valuable resource in the right quantity because they can be used as fertilizer. Yet too much waste is produced to be useful fertilizer. It collects in “lagoons,” where it threatens to overrun or to leech into water. It gets sprayed on fields where it runs off and becomes a pollutant that renders water undrinkable, unswimmable, and, for aquatic animals, uninhabitable. In too concentrated a form, it renders soil unusable. And animal feces produce GHGs, just like animals’ burps and farts do. It produces stench and respiratory illness for those nearby.

People who will live in the future will deal with environmental problems that are indirect results of industrial farming, traceable in part to the quantities of GHGs produced by industrially farmed animals and to the clear-cutting that is done to grow food for factory-farmed animals. When GHGs from crops that are grown to feed animals are taken into account, and also the associated deforestation in some areas associated with grazing and cultivating this feed, most experts estimate that around 10% to 15% of all global GHG emissions are the result of animal agriculture.\textsuperscript{12} By comparison, all of the

\textsuperscript{12} For the high end of this range, see P. J. Gerber, H. Steinfeld, B. Henderson, A. Mottet, C. Opio, J. Dijkman, A. Falcucci, and G. Tempio, “Tackling Climate Change through Livestock—A Global Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Opportunities,” UN FAO, 2013 (hereinafter FAO 2013); note that this study is by many of the same authors as and supersedes the slightly higher earlier estimates of H. Steinfeld, P. Gerber, T. Wassenaar, V. Castel, M. Rosales, and C. de Haan, “Livestock’s Long Shadow,” UN FAO, 2006; for the low end, see USA Environmental Protection Agency, “Non-CO\textsubscript{2}
world’s commercial airline emissions account for only about 2% of global GHG emissions, and all of the world’s road transport emissions (including, but not limited to, automobile emissions) account for about 10%. So, globally, consuming animal products is a larger contributor to climate change than even driving automobiles.

Industrial animal agriculture also has negative effects on present people, some of which are immediately perceptible and other of which are not. People who live near industrial animal farms suffer from stench and sickness from contaminated water and from gases and parasites. Workers on industrial farms suffer high rates of work-related injuries.

People who live farther away might deal with contamination from seepage due to farm waste. People might deal with contamination due to excess waste being spread on fields and then draining off into the water supply. They might deal with contaminated meat.

People who live farther away might deal, too, with farm-bred viruses and antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Industrial animal farms are, in various ways, good breeding grounds for viruses and bacteria. The stress on the animals weakens their immune system. Their proximity to each other makes passage of viruses easy. The antibiotics they take wipe out some bacteria but, in doing so, clear the field for the “fittest” bacteria.

Most obviously, industrial animal agriculture has effects on animals and raises questions about the ethics of raising animals for food, of hurting them for food, and of killing them very young for food. Yet those questions are also raised, to some extent, by more humane, less industrial methods of farming. In the ideal, these methods of farming involve raising domestic animals (mostly) outdoors in ways that take advantage of their natural tendencies and make them well-off. So for pigs it might involve giving the animals plenty of room outdoors to roam, places to build nests, areas in which to forage, and so on. It might also involve giving them toys to play with and man-made piles of things in which to forage, neither of which is at all natural but both of which take advantage of pigs’ natural proclivities.

Is it permissible to raise and kill living things to eat them? Moral vegans typically think so: it is permissible to kill carrots to eat them. Some think it is permissible to kill oysters. But not cattle. It is wrong to kill cattle. So, on their view, that a thing is alive Global Inventory: Appendix, Supplement, 2012 (hereinafter EPA 2012). By adding the same proportion of indirect to direct emissions from FAO 2013 to the estimates of direct emissions from animal agriculture that are the focus of EPA 2012, one arrives at approximately 10% of the global GHG emissions. Compare also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2010), WG3 AR5, ch. 11, where the relevant discussion is based on the same sort of estimates as EPA 2012, and compare the claim that “the livestock sector may be responsible for 8–18% of GHGs, a significant share considering their projected growth,” in Mario Herrero and Philip Thornton, “Livestock and Global Change: Emerging Issues for Sustainable Food Systems,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (2013): 20878–20881; see also Mario Herrero et al., “Biomass Use, Production, Feed Efficiencies, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Global Livestock Systems,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (2013): 20888–20893.

13 IPCC, WG3 AR5, ch. 8, p. 606, where domestic and international aviation are reported to be a little less than 1 GT CO2eq and road transport emissions 5 GT CO2eq, out of total global emissions of 49 GT CO2eq. The bulk of the rest of global GHG emissions are from power plants and industrial sources. (For global totals, see IPCC, WG3 AR5, Technical Summary, p. 42.)
does not make it morally wrong to kill it. What does? A certain sort of mentality. Plants, they think, lack it. Oysters too. Cattle, by contrast, have it. It is because of this mental life that it is not only morally objectionable to kill them but also to hurt them. In “Concerning Cattle: Behavioral and Neuroscientific Evidence for Pain, Desire, and Self-Consciousness,” Gary Comstock surveys the extant psychological literature on the mental lives of cattle, arguing that while they lack self-consciousness, they are sentient and have desires, including desires for the (near) future. Because of this package of cognitive capacities, he argues, it is wrong to deprive them of life (and, derivatively, to consume their dead bodies).

Charles List, by contrast, argues in “The New Hunter and Local Food,” that killing and eating large mammals is permissible and, in particular, hunting and consuming hunted animals is. He argues for this on environmental grounds but also on the basis of locavore considerations and anti-industrial agricultural considerations, some of which are described in Noll and Werkheiser’s essay. He argues, too, for the importance of producing meat oneself and for the moral importance of gratitude and respect toward animals.

List’s essay has clear applications to the case of fishing, one focus of Eliot Michaelson and Andrew Reisner’s “Ethics for Fish.” Like Comstock’s, the essay is partly about extant psychological evidence about the mental lives of animals—in Comstock’s essay cattle; in Michaelson and Reisner’s fish—and partly about ethical conclusions that that evidence supports. It considers both the permissibility of large-scale fishing that makes possible Fishwiches and elementary school cafeteria fish sticks and also small-scale subsistence fishing, the sort that List’s arguments can be extended to support. Whereas some think there are plain ethical dissimilarities between, say, fish and cattle that render killing the latter ethically problematic but killing the former unproblematic, Michaelson and Reisner think the two stand or fall together.

Part III: Consumption

Although the essays in Part II have some discussion of consumption, they are primarily about the ethics of food production, especially whether it is permissible to treat animals in various ways to get food from them and whether it is permissible to kill animals for food. Part III, “Consumption,” is primarily about whether it is permissible to consume various products (and, in one case, whether it is permissible, instead, to waste them).

Of course, these issues about production and consumption might be very closely connected. Indeed, it might seem that consumer ethics is straightforward and does not raise any difficult issues, and that the correct theory of consumer ethics is easy to identify: namely, that if something is produced in a way that is wrong, then it is always wrong to be a consumer of it. Call this the “Simple Principle” about consumer ethics. If the Simple Principle is true, then anytime some product is wrongfully produced, it immediately follows that it is wrong to be a consumer of it. If sweatshop labor is wrong, it is wrong to wear sweatshop-produced clothes. If cosmetics are made by wrongfully
hurting animals, it is wrong to buy them. If it is wrong to kill animals for food, it is wrong to eat their dead bodies.

Against this, someone who proposes that there is nothing wrong with watching NCAA sports on television, even though NCAA athletes are exploited in a way that makes it the case that the product being consumed—namely, NCAA sports on television—is wrongfully produced. Similarly, such a person might claim that there is nothing wrong with using electricity to watch a movie in one's home even if it is produced by a coal power plant and even though coal-generated electricity is produced in a way that is wrong because it generates a lot of pollutants as well as GHGs that do serious harm to people when better ways of producing electricity are available. Finally, such a person might expect us to agree that, at the very least, a dumpster diver who eats factory-farmed meat from the garbage has done nothing wrong, even if we think that factory-farmed meat is wrongfully produced.

These seem like counterexamples to the Simple Principle. There are other putative problems with it. Consider the *inefficacy objection* to it, an objection discussed in this section by Andrew Chignell, Bob Fischer, Tristram McPherson, and Julia Nefsky. The inefficacy objection is, roughly, that even if it is true that a large number of additional consumers of an objectionable product would make the world worse, nonetheless it makes no difference whether there is one more or one less single individual consumer of such a product because the addition or deletion of a single consumer would not make any difference to the quantity produced in the sort of large marketplaces that are the norm in the developed world. For example, if you buy a pork chop from a store every day, this will probably make no difference to how much pork the store orders, and thus will make no difference to how much pork the wholesaler that supplies the store orders, and so on—and thus will ultimately make no difference to how many pigs are raised for meat. If so, then it is permissible to consume such things even if they are wrongly produced. If so, the Simple Principle is false. The question is: What to replace it with?

In “The Ethical Basis for Veganism,” Tristram McPherson argues the case for veganism, first arguing that it is wrong to raise and kill animals for food and then arguing from that to the conclusion that it is wrong to consume animal products because doing so is variably, objectionably related to the wrongness of producing food. Yet McPherson’s veganism is “modest,” allowing for the consumption of bivalves, of roadkill, and of eggs that are produced under certain conditions (but not the conditions that produce eggs for grocery stores).

Bob Fischer’s “Arguments for Consuming Animal Products” goes over arguments for more catholic eating habits, providing some support for the consumption of bivalves and roadkill but also bugs, in vitro meat, meat that will otherwise go to waste, and also animals that have been raised for food but given good (and long-ish) lives.

These essays partly address the difficult issue of connecting the wrongness of the production of certain products to the wrongness of consumption of those products. It is not, in general, true that it is wrong to benefit from wrongdoing. Perhaps it is
wrong to “support” wrongdoing? But in what way is giving $5 to McDonald’s for a Happy Meal supporting McDonald’s? Five dollars is not even a rounding error in their books. And if you do not buy that Happy Meal, the next person in line will. In “Consumer Choice and Collective Impact,” Julia Nefsky notes that of course it is true that if everyone stopped buying some wrongfully produced product, the product would stop being produced, but it is far from clear what that shows about whether an individual consumer should stop buying that product. It is even less clear what to do when the consumer knows that if she does not buy that product, someone else will. May she buy? If not, why not? Nefsky surveys a range of answers to these questions.

In “Religious Dietary Practices and Secular Food Ethics; or, How to Hope That Your Food Choices Make a Difference Even When You Believe That They Don’t,” Andrew Chignell motivates what he calls a “broadly religious way of thinking” about food choices that helps to motivate people in the face of what seems like individual ineffectiveness. Dietary restrictions—Muslims and Jews are forbidden pork, Catholics are forbidden meat on Fridays, some Buddhist monks are required to eat all and only what is given to them—constitute an important part of religions. And while motivations vary, an important thread is that the effects of adhering to these restrictions are not limited to what we perceive and are valuable even in the absence of effects on anyone other than the eater. Confronted with one’s apparent ineffectiveness to change the food system, someone—religious or not—might “seriously believe, or at least tenaciously hope, that the significance of her individual food choices goes well beyond what is immediately observed or empirically measurable” and because of this persist in the face of real or apparent ineffectiveness.

Worries about ineffectiveness and the importance of collective action arise not only with regard to consumption of food but with its non-consumption: food left on the vine, food left to rot in stockpiles or thrown in a dumpster, food we do not eat and throw away. Your parent tells you not to waste food because somewhere people are starving. Your personal food waste, your parent thinks, is a moral concern; you should eat up. In “The Clean Plate Club? Food Waste and Individual Responsibility,” Jaclyn Hatala Matthes and Erich Hatala Matthes question whether an emphasis on individual action is appropriate, specifically in the context of food waste. In the United States, 40% of the food that is grown or produced is wasted—for example, it is left in the fields because it looks funny, it spoils in transport, or it is thrown out by processors, retailers, or consumers, much of it ending up as methane-producing waste in landfills. Waste in the food system extends beyond the waste of food, including also the inefficient use of water and other resources in agriculture. After describing the nature and scope of the waste problem, Matthes and Matthes argue that food waste should be seen as a political and institutional problem—and thus that “discharging our moral duty with respect to reducing food waste will be largely a matter of political advocacy and activism rather than a matter of making substantial changes to our individual food behaviors.”
Part IV: Food Justice and Social Justice

Part IV, “Food Justice and Social Justice,” concerns a set of issues related to justice—including racial, social, and economic justice—in the food system. Just as we might distinguish the academic study of food ethics from the movement to make the food system more ethical, we might distinguish the food justice movement from the academic study of food justice. The food justice movement is a social justice movement that aims to transform the food system by addressing a range of problems, including:

- Low wages and poor working conditions for agricultural workers, fast food workers, and other food service workers
- Hunger, malnutrition, and food insecurity (not being able to reliably afford enough food)
- Inadequate access to high-quality food, which includes issues like the higher price of many healthier foods and the existence of food deserts, areas where a significant percentage of people have low access to healthier food because they live far from a grocery store or another source of healthy food and do not have access to a car
- Racism, classism, sexism, and exclusionary practices in the food system and in other food movements
- Lack of equal participation in decision-making about food
- Indigenous peoples losing access to foods that were traditionally central to their identity, culture, and economy (what are called first foods)
- The environmental unsustainability of many contemporary forms of industrial agriculture

Different food justice organizations may understand food justice somewhat differently, and have different priorities with regard to it. But they typically reflect an understanding of food justice as requiring more equitable access to resources and more decision-making power for communities, with an explicit focus on racial equality. This is how some proponents describe food justice:

A socially just food system is one in which power and material resources are shared equitably so that people and communities can meet their needs, and live with security and dignity, now and into the future.14

Food justice is the right of communities everywhere to produce, process, distribute, access, and eat good food regardless of race, class, gender, ethnicity, citizenship, ability, religion, or community.15

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Food Justice is communities exercising their right to grow, sell, and eat healthy food. Healthy food is fresh, nutritious, affordable, culturally-appropriate, and grown locally with care for the well-being of the land, workers, and animals. People practicing food justice leads to a strong local food system, self-reliant communities, and a healthy environment.\(^\text{16}\)

Philosophers typically understand justice as, most basically, about fair relations between people and about people getting what they are owed. It is about fair relations between existing people but also about fair relations between existing people and future people, and future people getting what they are owed, which is known as intergenerational justice. Some theorists claim that animals fall under the purview of justice, and so justice is also about fair relations between people and animals, and animals getting what they are owed. Some theorists claim justice applies only within a society; others claim that justice can cross social and national borders.

Justice requires, at a minimum, that people have basic liberties and political rights. It requires, too, distributive justice, which is concerned with the fair distribution throughout society of important things. Theorists disagree about what must be distributed fairly: goods and services (such as income and health care), well-being, opportunities (such as educational opportunities), capabilities, or something else? Theorists also disagree about what counts as a just or fair distribution. They disagree about which laws and institutions—for example, educational policies or tax policies or food assistance policies—will achieve this distribution. However, it is not only the actions of governments, the distribution of goods, or the structure of public institutions that can be unjust. Social attitudes, social norms, and social practices can also constrain people's options and life chances in ways that seem unfair, and thus seem like instances of injustice. Thus, some theorists argue that justice requires, in addition to a fair distribution of important goods, opportunities, and so on, equal social standing or equal social status of other sorts.

Now return to the list of problems identified by the food justice movement. We can map this list onto forms of injustice identified by philosophers. Hunger and malnutrition, food insecurity, lack of access to healthy food in food deserts, and the high cost of healthier foods are all distributive justice issues—that is, issues of fair distribution throughout society of important things. Food deserts are also seen as a racial justice issue because they are caused in part by housing policies that are racist and are unjust for that reason. Low wages and poor working conditions for workers raise concerns of exploitation as well as being a distributive justice issue. Racism in the food system (e.g., discrimination against African Americans farmers by the US Department of Agriculture) is an issue of procedural justice, an issue of fair procedures for making decisions, as well as an instance of what Iris Marion Young holds is the injustice of marginalization, in which some groups are cut off from work opportunities.\(^\text{17}\) The environmental unsustainability


of industrial agriculture is an issue of intergenerational justice—future generations are given less than their share of certain environmental goods. Some critics of the alternative food movement say that it is exclusionary, reflecting the experience and values of middle-class white people and not reflecting the perspectives of low-income people and people of color. The criticism, in other words, is that the alternative food movement is characterized by a form of cultural imperialism, in which a dominant group establishes its culture as the norm.

There is an additional form of justice at play in the food justice movement, as Kyle Powys Whyte explains in his contribution to this volume, "Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance." Food justice arguably also requires that groups have those experiences and social relations involving food that are central to their way of life, free from certain kinds of interference by others. In other words, food justice requires collective self-determination with regards to food and the food-related aspects of a way of life—often called food sovereignty. The underlying ethical idea is that justice requires collective self-determination.

Food sovereignty raises a number of interesting and deep questions. What moral reasons do we have not to interfere with groups’ collective relations? Are there moral reasons not to interfere with groups’ collective relations in addition to our moral reasons not to harm individuals, or violate their autonomy, or interfere with their self-determination? What kinds of interference with collective food relations are morally acceptable and consistent with justice?

The essays in Part IV of this book concern issues that fall under the broad heading of food justice and social justice.

Lee A. McBride III’s essay “Racial Imperialism and Food Traditions” begins by noting that “one topic that is seldom broached in food ethics is race.” Part of the explanation is disagreement about what whether race is a useful thing to talk about at all or, instead, is a “harmful fiction.” And then there is disagreement about whether race is a useful thing to talk about with regard to food ethics in particular. Are racial categories not necessary to get a handle on ethical issues related to food? Or are racial categories necessary in order to articulate certain ethical concerns, for example, ethical concerns with the cultural appropriation of foodways by outgroups?

McBride argues that we should adopt Alain Locke’s account of race. “Race, on this account, names inherited or preferred traits and values passed from generation to generation; it operates as tradition. Cultivated and maintained styles, techniques, and cultural products are the characteristic features of racial groupings.” McBride argues that this view allows us to recognize cultural contributions to cultural products, for example, the contributions of South Asians to curries and the contributions of black Americans to rock and roll; these cultural contributions have sometimes been discredited by socially dominant groups. At the same time, Locke’s account of race does not require us

to advocate “proprietary ownership of cultural products.” Indeed, McBride argues that cultural products typically result from cultural exchange, and the exchanges that have created current foodways are complex. McBride argues furthermore that “vested interest in the ownership of cultural goods lies at the heart of racial imperialism” and thus should be rejected.

In his essay, Kyle Powys Whyte outlines a theory of indigenous food systems that describes the type of value food has in relation to the concept of indigenous collective continuance. His essay first articulates the nature of the relationships that make up collective continuance, focusing on trustworthiness and redundancy in particular. He then argues that US settler colonialism can be seen as a form of injustice that directly undermines these relationships that make up collective continuance. According to Whyte, an “injustice occurs, under settler colonial domination, when at least one society, the settler society, interferes with the qualities of relationships constitutive of collective continuance, which imposes social and environmental changes on indigenous peoples in a way that is nonconsensual and at a rate so rapid that the indigenous communities suffer harms that would have been preventable before settlement.” This kind of injustice can furthermore be understood as a violation of food sovereignty; Whyte suggests that one dimension of food sovereignty, as some indigenous people understand food sovereignty, includes maintaining these food-related aspects of collective continuance, free from domination by other groups.

In his essay “Food, Fairness, and Global Markets,” Madison Powers argues that the organization of global agricultural markets is unfair in multiple ways. The global food supply needs to increase in coming decades in order to feed a rapidly growing world population, yet there is fundamental disagreement about how to increase agricultural output while satisfying norms of fairness. “Market fundamentalists” support pro-market, pro-globalization approaches, seeing them as both the most efficient option and capable of being fair. Critics, including Powers, argue that markets can fall short, failing to achieve efficiency or failing to satisfy norms of fairness. Powers argues, in particular, against trade subsidies and protectionist restrictions, contract agriculture, large-scale farmland acquisition, and promoting shifts in agricultural production from crops intended for local consumption to commodities intended for export.

The perception of unfairness in global agricultural markets has helped to produce some of the most visible food activism. Yet other complaints have contributed, too: complaints about racism or imperialism, complaints about a lack of autonomy, complaints about unjust distribution of food, and so on. Indeed, as Jeff Sebo notes in “Multi-Issue Food Activism,” food activism not only responds to a variety of food-ethical complaints, in particular, but to ethical complaints more generally. The movement comprises small bore activists (people looking for a few extra hours for their farmers’ market) and large bore activists (people working to abolish factory farming). It comprises people narrowly focused on, say, chickens and people focused on dismantling neoliberalism. Sebo argues in favor of multi-issue activism and provides some guidance in how to get it done.
Part V: Ethics and Politics of Food Policy

Part V, “Ethics and Politics of Food Policy,” includes some further discussion of two topics that are taken up by food justice advocates: food and autonomy and the treatment of food workers. It discusses some ethical and legal issues with specific kinds of food policies, including healthy eating policies, food labeling, and agricultural guest worker programs. The first essay in this part, “Public Justification and the Politics of Agriculture” by Dan C. Shahar, discusses the meta issue of how controversial policies—policies about which there is deep disagreement and ethical controversy—can be acceptable to citizens, even though many citizens object to them. Shahar discusses disagreement about industrialized agriculture—seen by proponents as necessary to feed the world and seen by opponents as environmentally disastrous, unjust, and objectionable in other ways. Shahar asks whether we can expect agricultural policies to be acceptable to citizens, and acceptable in what way, given that any conceivable set of policies will likely be seen as deeply problematic by some citizens. He reaches the sobering conclusion that we should not expect any set of policies and rules to earn wholehearted support or even to be embraced as morally authoritative by all. Perhaps the best we can hope for is a Hobbesian form of public justification, in which each side accepts policies as “justified”—in the sense of being willing to acquiesce to these policies—because they recognize these policies as better than nothing, even if they also find the policies abhorrent.

In “Paternalism, Food, and Personal Freedom,” Sarah Conly argues in favor of (some) coercive policies that promote healthy eating, for example, policies limiting the portion size of junk foods. Insofar as these policies are meant to make individuals eat more healthfully in order to make those individuals better off, they are subject to ethical objections to government paternalism, for example, that these policies fail to respect individual autonomy, that they are demeaning, or that they will fail to make individuals better off because individuals are better placed than the government to know and to promote their own good (an assumption that behavioral economics has called into question, with evidence that humans have bounded rationality and do not reliably make welfare-enhancing choices). Conly argues for policies that are paternalistic and coercive by arguing that they are relevantly similar to food safety measures that we generally accept, such as inspections for salmonella. “In each case government tries to protect people from choices that do not advance their ends,” Conly argues.

The government is also coercive about food labeling. As Seana Valentine Shiffrin discusses in “Deceptive Advertising and Taking Responsibility for Others,” in California, it is illegal for Gerber baby food to advertise a product as being made with “real fruit

juices and other all natural ingredients” even though that product is made with real fruit juices and other all natural ingredients. The advertising is held to be deceptive—and Gerber legally liable for that deception—since people naturally but fallaciously infer that all the baby food’s ingredients are all-natural. At first blush, this is puzzling: How can Gerber be responsible for deception when the false belief comes from a fallacious inference by consumers? Isn’t it objectionably paternalistic toward consumers to hold Gerber so responsible? Or inconsistent with free speech law? Shiffrin argues that food advertisers, like advertisers generally, have a duty of care toward consumers such that they may not court “misunderstanding—even when the listener bears intellectual fault for the error.” This picture is undergirded by the idea that it is part of the producer’s job to free up consumers from figuring out various things about the food they buy. Far from being paternalistic, holding Gerber liable enhances the freedom of consumers. This suggests some general ideas about deception and liability as well as some particular ideas about how to label food.

Part V finishes with two essays on food producers, in particular, food workers.

In “Food Labor Ethics,” Tyler Doggett and Seth M. Holmes survey some of the ethical issues that come up in food work. They use agricultural labor on large farms in the western United States as an entry into issues of coercion and exploitation, immigration, racism and classism, and the suffering that goes into providing cheap produce year-round.

Of course, lots of jobs are bad in all sorts of ways. Food work, in particular, has long been bad in all sorts of ways. Its special, contemporary, American badness derives partly from American laws—and their (lack of) enforcement—and international trade agreements. One effect of these agreements has been a steady flow of labor moving to the United States from Central America. Social scientists estimate that between 25% and 70% of farm labor comes from illegal immigrants. Much of the hard labor Doggett and Holmes detail is undertaken by impoverished people from other countries.20 Is this just? What if the labor is part of a program, a “guest worker” program, that is designed to provide short-term labor that is financially beneficial for farm owners and workers? Sabine Tsuruda’s “The Moral Burdens of Temporary Farm Work” explains the workings and moral defense of such programs and argues that they are fundamentally morally flawed, based on the idea that we can render the various bads of farm work permissible by providing enough money to the person upon whom those bads are inflicted. Crucially, this is not an argument against farm work per se but, rather, of farm work done on a temporary basis out of one’s country. Yet currently America and other countries depend on such labor.


Tsuruda finishes with some ideas about how to improve this morally problematic state of affairs.

**Part VI: Gender, Body Image, and “Healthy” Eating**

Part VI, “Gender, Body Image, and ‘Healthy’ Eating,” includes four essays that take a critical eye to our public discourse about, and personal experiences of, dieting, healthy eating, and obesity prevention.

Feminist philosophers have argued for decades that dieting and eating disorders need to be seen as reflecting gender ideology and the pressure women face to be thin and fit, and need to be seen as forms of gender oppression that perpetuate inequality. In “Food Insecurity: Dieting as Ideology, as Oppression, and as Privilege,” Tracy Isaacs takes the feminist critique of dieting on board and offers a twist on it. Isaacs argues that dieting is a practice that reflects both oppression and privilege. Isaacs agrees with feminist arguments that “dieting and the pursuit of thinness constitute an oppressive ideology.” Yet those who diet are privileged in relation to the food insecure people around the world who lack access to sufficient food: from this perspective “restrictive dieting by choice in order to lose weight is an unimaginable luxury.”

Some recent philosophical work takes scholars’ critical approach to dieting and applies it to healthy eating and obesity prevention. According to this work, intense concern with eating healthfully and preventing obesity, and efforts at the same, need to be understood in their cultural context. They reflect moral attitudes and cultural norms about eating, gender, body shape, fat, and pleasure. In “Shame, Seduction, and Character in Food Messaging,” Rebecca Kukla argues that eating practices are seen as having characterological significance—how you eat reveals what kind of character you have. The perceived connection between eating and character is complex: fat people are framed as disgusting, irresponsible, and having poor character. Yet they are also seen as eating “unhealthily” and “unhealthy” eating is also seen as pleasurable, and rewarding, on analogy with sexual perversions: “just as we aesthetically and morally denigrate those who indulge in unusual, or frequent . . . gustatory pleasure, we inseparably and correspondingly valorize them as brave and impressive risk-takers unafraid of pleasure. Conversely, we stigmatize ‘prudes’ and ‘frigid’ people who are overly pure and self-controlled, at the same time as we hold them up as paragons of appropriate self-discipline.” This simultaneous denigration and valorization of “unhealthy” eating means that there is no “right” way to eat and “so there is no right kind of person to be in our culture, when it comes to food.”

Beth Dixon’s essay “Obesity and Responsibility” concerns another respect in which obesity and healthy eating are moralized: individuals are held responsible for being

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Obese. Scholars have described the public conversation about obesity as characterized by moral judgments about people with obesity, including attributions of responsibility to them. Scholars have responded by pointing out that obesity has social and environmental causes: obesity is a response to a food environment pervaded with unhealthy foods that are designed to be hard to resist and are aggressively marketed. And obesity results not just from our immediate food environments but is also influenced by poverty and social inequality, as well as technological and lifestyle change, which are buttressed by social policies. Given the environmental and social causes of obesity, the argument goes, individuals lack the kind of causal responsibility for obesity that would warrant holding them responsible for obesity—that is, morally blaming them or holding them liable for health care costs or other social costs associated with obesity. Dixon’s essay is broadly sympathetic to this response, while adding some nuance to it. Dixon argues that we should reject the false dichotomy of attributing moral responsibility for being obese to all people with obesity, or attributing it to none. Dixon provides an account of situated moral agency and uses it to argue that some people with obesity are not morally responsible because factors interfere with their capacity to detect moral considerations in favor of healthy eating or because structural inequalities interfere with their capacity to act on these considerations.

Although she does not use the term, Christina van Dyke, too, considers the situated moral agency of people with orthorexia, the obsession with finding and sticking to an ideal diet. In “Eat Y’Self Fitter: Orthorexia, Health, and Gender,” van Dyke argues that orthorexia is a real, surprisingly widespread phenomenon, that its appearance is partly due to features of food marketing that Isaacs, Kukla, and Shiffrin discuss in this book, partly due to contemporary ideas of health, but also partly due to the variety of foods available in large parts of the world. She argues it has something like a religious significance for people that suffer from it, promising a way to “transcend rather than to embrace the realities of embodiment . . . orthorexia is best understood as a manifestation of age-old anxieties about human finitude and mortality—anxieties which current dominant sociocultural forces prime us to experience and express in unhealthy attitudes toward healthy eating.”

Part VII: Food and Social Identities, Cultural Practices, and Values

For the orthorexic, what is eaten has a deep personal significance. What we eat also has undeniable social significance. The personal, social, and moral significance of food is the topic of Part VII, “Food and Social Identities, Cultural Practices, and Values.”

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As Guptill et al. write, “the popular saying ‘You are what you eat’ is not just a nutritional adage.” Specific food practices are linked to some personal identities and group identities. For example, as is discussed in Chignell’s essay in this book, religions prescribe food practices, including eating certain foods as part of rituals and on holidays, not eating certain foods, and periodically fasting. Guptill et al. give some further examples of how food practices are linked to identities:

If you eat Vegemite every day, you are probably Australian; if you nosh on grits and collard greens, chances are high that you are from the southern US; if you eat steak and lobster regularly, you are most likely middle or upper class; and, if you normally consume salad and other ‘lighter fare,’ you are probably a woman.

Because they are so strongly linked with group identity, food practices are an effective way to monitor group boundaries, identifying some people as insiders and others as outsiders, with both positive and negative effects. Participating together in food practices that are unique—food practices that are “ours” and not “theirs”—can bring groups of people closer together, giving them feelings of commonality and solidarity, making them feel connected to a shared history. But group-based food practices can also serve as a locus of hostility between groups.

Food practices are obviously linked to social identities. But what exactly is the relation between them? The opening essay of this part, “I Eat, Therefore I Am: Disgust and the Intersection of Food and Identity,” takes up this issue. Daniel Kelly and Nicolae Morar explain the relations that hold between food (and cuisine, eating, and dining) and social identities (which are unpacked in terms of social roles and social norms), giving an account informed by work in empirical moral psychology. Having given this general account, they emphasize that disgust is the emotion most predominant in food norms—making disgust an effective tool in attempts to change food norms. They raise ethical concerns with using disgust in this way, given evidence that disgust disrupts our ability to see the object of disgust as an agent—in other words, evidence that disgust is dehumanizing. Lastly, they consider the implications of their account for efforts to change what people eat—noting that “if you are what you eat, then attempts to change what and how you eat are, in effect, attempts to alter your identity, who you are.”

What other ethical issues are raised by the fact that food practices are linked to group identities? One set of issues concerns our duties to accommodate such food practices. Are there cases in which food practices that would otherwise be prohibited should be tolerated because of their centrality to group identities or their cultural significance? For example, should kosher and halal foods be provided in school lunch programs?

24 Ibid.
traditions.” So should school lunches include not only kosher and halal options but also vegan options? As another example, discussed by Paula Casal, should practitioners of the religion Santeria be allowed to sacrifice animals in the way prescribed by their religion, even though that method of sacrifice would otherwise fall foul of animal cruelty laws, because the practice is central to their religious and cultural identities? These questions connect to the food sovereignty debate and group’s rights to collective self-determination. As Kyle Powys Whyte has argued, one demand of food justice is that groups have a right to exercise their collective food relations without interference from other groups, unless there is a morally weighty reason for the interference.

To some, the whole idea of morally weighty reasons to interfere with others’ eating practices will sound odd. “Is it delicious?” is, for most people, more important than “Is it okay to eat it?” For most, “Is it okay to eat it?” does not even sound moral—it sounds like a question about prudence or etiquette or aesthetics. In “Morality and Aesthetics of Food,” Shen-yi Liao and Aaron Meskin consider some questions squarely in aesthetics—Is food art? What is the role of expertise in discerning how delicious food is?—and some of the relations between food ethics and food aesthetics. Centrally, it argues for “food immoralism,” according to which a moral defect in food can explain an aesthetic virtue. In a way, food’s bad character can be part of what makes it delicious.

Kate Nolfi’s “Food Choices and Moral Character” concerns the character of eaters rather than the eaten. So much of our eating is unthinking, and, so far as we think about what we eat, that thought is typically not careful, thorough deliberation about whether we may eat this or that. Such unthinking or not-carefully-thought-out action, Nolfi argues, is especially illuminating of moral character.

In “The Etiquette of Eating,” Karen Stohr discusses etiquette, in particular the etiquette conventions that govern eating together. These conventions serve an important moral purpose, she argues: they form the essential structure of eating together, setting the terms on which guests interact, and thus facilitating interactions that can be morally valuable. For example, Kant thought that eating together, when conducted properly, is an opportunity to improve one’s understanding through rational conversation and to create social bonds through mutual enjoyment. But for shared meals to serve these purposes (rather than to undermine them) requires participants to abide by certain rules, such as avoiding challenging topics at the beginning of the meal while people are still hungry (and cantankerous). In short, etiquette extends far beyond rules about which fork to use for what; and at its best, etiquette is not a way to reinforce social distinctions and hierarchies. Rather, when executed properly etiquette is a part of morality because

it facilitates social interactions that improve us morally and create morally valuable relationships.

So Stohr argues that what strikes some as fussiness or preciousness of etiquette is actually valuable. Susan Wolf in “The Ethics of Being a Foodie” argues for something similar with regard to another activity sometimes regarded as fussy or precious, being a foodie. Like an etiquette maven, a foodie might seem morally suspect. Wolf explains why and then defends foodie-ism from the charge, concluding that “foodies . . . have nothing to be ashamed of. Not only is there nothing morally wrong with being a foodie, being a foodie has the potential to influence and contribute to one’s life in particularly rich and ethically rewarding ways” as one’s aesthetic passion for food naturally leads to various ethical concerns.

Part VIII: History of Philosophy and Food Ethics

The book ends—untraditionally—with a discussion of some of the history of food ethics. Katja Maria Vogt discusses ancient Greek thought about eating in “Who You Are Is What You Eat: Food in Ancient Thought.” Like Susan Wolf, ancient ethicists pondered the role of food in the good life. Like Shen-yi Liao and Aaron Meskin, they wondered about the relations between aesthetic and ethical reasons. Like some contemporary philosophers of language, they wondered about whether differences in taste showed something interesting about relativism. Yet Greek ethics, as Vogt demonstrates, includes a range of questions about eating and its role in our everyday lives, questions contemporary ethicists make even recognize as ethical: what hunger is, why we hunger, and how and why to control the desire to eat that hunger produces. Vogt proposes that these questions should be included in food ethics once again, “thus starting out, like ancient thought on eating, from ordinary experiences.”

Whereas there has been some work on ancient Greek food ethics, there has, as Henrik Lagerlund notes in “Food Ethics in the Middle Ages,” been nearly no work done on medieval food ethics. In Tristram Stuart’s massive survey of modern vegetarianism, medieval influences appear four times, significantly less often than pagan influences.28

In Daniel Dombrowski’s condensed summary of the history of vegetarianism, medieval philosophy merits a paragraph, a much briefer appearance than modern work or the ancient work to which it was deeply indebted.29 Both medieval and ancient Greek food ethics include work on the ethics of raising and killing animals for food and on the ethics of consumption, and some of the medieval arguments there clearly owe a debt to the Greeks. There was work, too, on the Aristotelian issue of whether and why to control appetites. Yet the thinkers Lagerlund focuses on depart from the ancient Greeks in filtering their ethical concerns through medieval Christianity. Issues like fasting and

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gluttony that are not widely discussed in contemporary food ethics—although fasting is a central topic in Andrew Chignell’s contribution to this book—were of central concern. And issues that remain discussed today—the raising and killing of animals—were approached differently, making much of the idea that God gave people dominion over the animals, an idea that shows up in contemporary discussions but is somewhat uncommon.

As John Grey and Aaron Garrett discuss in “You Are What You Eat, but Should You Eat What You Are? Modern Philosophical Dietetics,” modern food ethics will seem on the whole more familiar to contemporary eyes in both form and content without seeming entirely familiar. Topics alien to contemporary food ethics showed up, too, most strikingly whether there is a moral requirement to eat well in order to do good work or a moral requirement to eat well to build a “moral republic.” Again, there is a concern with why we eat as a moral issue that is largely absent from contemporary discussions. But topics familiar to contemporary food ethics—the moral status of animals, the ethics of letting people starve, the justice of various distributions of food—surfaced too and were dealt with in ways that are sometimes strikingly familiar (Anne Conway’s idea that we owe justice to animals) and other times strikingly odd (Conway’s idea that eating releases the spirits of what we eat).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Some of this introduction is based on our contributions to Food, Ethics, and Society: An Introductory Text with Readings, ed. Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

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